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1. INTRODUCTION 
In [l], the author applied Nash’s bargaining scheme in finite games to 
differential games with nonzero-sum payoffs and obtained some sufficient 
conditions for optimal strategies. In that paper, the basis on which the players 
bargain is the max-min payoff of each individual player. The results of the 
bargain depend, in addition to the max-min payoffs, on the boundary of the 
feasible set. 
A factor that was not considered in [I] is the individual player’s ability to 
threaten his opponent. Roughly speaking, it is the ability to inflict a certain 
amount of loss on the opponent without incurring too much damage to the 
player himself. If the players choose their strategies with the intention of 
threatening their opponents, then there results a pair of threat payoffs. 
The idea of bargaining on the basis of the threat payoffs is explained in [2] 
for finite games. In the present paper, we consider the same problem for 
differential games and give a proposition by which an optimal pair of threat 
strategies could be found. The proposition is then applied to linear differential 
games with quadratic payoffs. The relations between the parameters of the 
linear system with quadratic payoffs and the players’s ability of threat will be 
seen. 
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Consider the differential games described by the set of differential equations 
*i = fi(x, u, q, 40) = x0 , i = 1, 2,..., n (1) 
where 
x = (x1 ,...) Lx*)‘, II = (Ul ,..., up)’ 
161 
and 2, = (q ,..., 7&)‘. 
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u and v are to be chosen by the first and the second players so as to maximize 
the following payoffs, respectively: 
11 = joT 4(x, 4 dt (2) 
Jz = joT 4(x, 4 dt (3) 
where T is the fixed terminal time. 
In a cooperative differential game, the players must agree on some way of 
cooperation and determine their strategies for the entire period of the game 
before it begins. We define an admissible pair of strategies as a pair of 
functions (u( ., x0), v(*, x0)), where u(., x,,) E U and v(*, x,,) E I’ and U and V 
are some classes of functions such that Jr and Ja are defined for each u E U 
and v E V and that the feasible set S, which is defined as 
is convex. 
We assume that the players agree to follow Nash’s scheme in two steps to 
determine their strategies: 
(i) Each player announces an admissible strategy independent of the 
other, which we shall denote by 7) and 5, respectively. Let (+r , +2) E S be the 
corresponding payoffs if (7, 5) were actually used. 17 and 14 are called the threat 
strategies. 
(ii) The players bargain and agree on jointly maximizing (Jr - $r) 
(JZ - +2). They will then accept I1 and JZ , respectively, as their payoffs 
where 
Let (s, V) be the pair that yields (J1 , J,). (u, 8) is the strategy pair that is 
used in the actual play of the game. 1, and I2 , called the arbitrated payoffs, 
are the actual payoffs that come out after the game is played. 
The strategies rl and .$ that are announced in step (i) determine (4i ,&) 
and consequently (i; , J2). Jr and J2 are therefore functional of the threat 
strategies, i.e., 
Jl = Ml, 0 (6) 
J2 = 12h 0 (7) 
The problem for each player is therefore to announce a threat strategy in 
step (i) so that the arbitrated payoff in step (ii) is maximized. We now define 
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an optimal pair of threat strategies as satisfying the equilibrium condition 
MT*, E*) >, I,(% 5*1, (8) 
url*, t*) 3 WI*> E) (9) 
for all admissible (7, E). 
In Section 3 we shall establish some sufficient conditions for (q*, [*). 
3. SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS 
PROPOSITION. If there exist a constant 0 < p < co and two admissible 
pairs (T*, t*) and (u*, u*) such that 
Jdu*, a*) + PJ&*, v*) = y$Jl + PJ& (10) 
J&I*, 5*) - ~Jdrl*, S*> = m$ mzx(J1 - I11Jz) 
= yx m$(J, - PJA, 
(11) 
and 
J&*, v*> - J&I*> 5*) = AJ&*, u*) - J&I*, (*)I (12) 
for all admissible (u, v), then (T*, e*) is the optimal pair of threat strategies and 
Jdu*, v*) and Jz(u*, v*) are the optimal arbitrated payofJs; i.e., 
Jdu”, v*) = UT*, E”), (13) 
Jz@*, v*) = I&l*, E*). (14) 
The proof can be carried out from a geometric viewpoint (see Fig. 1). 
Let S,, be the Pareto-optimal boundary1 of S. At each point on S,, either a 
line can be drawn with a slope equal to the negative of the tangent slope at 
that point or a family of supporting lines rr exist and a corresponding family 
of lines rr’ can be drawn through that point with the slope of a line in n’ 
equal to the negative of a line in n. Because of the convexity of S, pairs of 
these lines do not intersect in the interior of S and there is only one line 
which passes through each point in the interior of S. 
Suppose (n*, f*) is the pair of threat strategies that are announced in 
step (i), and K = (J1(7*, f*), Jz(q*, t*)) the corresponding point in S. 
According to [2], L is the point for the arbitrated payoffs. 
’ See [2] for the definition. 
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FIGURE 1 
But from Eq. (9), (II*, v*) is such that Jr + p Jz is maximized. Obviously, 
(I&*, vu*), Jz(u*, v*)) E S, . Here we distinguish between two cases: 
(a) J1(u*, er*) = J1(7*, S*) and J2(u*, v*) = Jz(r)*, f*). (Actually one 
implies the other because of Eq. (11)). Then (Jr(v*, f*), Jz(q*, t*)) E S,, and 
Jdu*, v*) and Jz(u*, v*) are the arbitrated payoffs. 
(b) Jdu*, v*> f Jh*, 5*) and thus J2(u*, u*) # Jz(~*, f*). Com- 
bining Eqs. (9) and (1 l), we have 
(I&*> v*) - Jh*, E*N 11 + (I&*, v*> - Id?*, 5*N Jz 
< (Jz@*, u*) - Jh*, f*N Jh*, u*> (15) 
+ (Jh*, u*> - Jh”, E*N Jzb*, u*>. 
From Eq. (14), Lemma VII.2.3 and VII.2.4 of [2], we concluded that 
L = (J1(u*, z~*), Jz(u*, v*)). Thus J1(u*, v*) and J2(u*, w*) are again the 
arbitrated payoffs corresponding to (v*, E*). 
We can write, in both cases 
MI*, 5*) = Jdu”, v*), (16) 
MI*, t*) = I&*, v*). (17) 
Next, suppose (v*, 5) is the pair of threat strategies. By Eq. (IO), we have 
J&I*, E*) - ~Jzh*> E*) G J&I*, 0 - CLJ~(T*, 0 (18) 
Let M = (J1(~*, .$), J2(q*, 5)). Because of Eq. (18) M must be lying below 
KL. The point N = (Ir(q*, (),1a(q*, [)) E S, in Fig. 1 is for the arbitrated 
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payoffs. Because KL and MN do not intersect within S and S is convex, we 
should have 
But this implies either 
or 
lz(rl*, E) >, Jz(u*, v*). (19) 
M?*, 0 < .m*, v*) (20) 
N=L 
for otherwise N 4 S, . So, we obtain 
(21) 
which is Eq. (8). Equation (9) can be proved in the same way. The proof is 
therefore finished. 
From Eq. (10) it is clear that the optimal threat strategies are chosen in 
such a way as to maximize the player’s own payoff and at the same time 
minimize the opponent’s payoff, thus constituting a threat to the opponent. 
If p is very small, the first player concentrates mainly on maximizing Ji in 
choosing his threat strategy. This means that he has better control of his 
own payoff than of his opponent’s. The second player has better control of 
the first player’s payoff and is more concerned with minimizing Ji . The 
reverse is true when p is very large. 
In the next section, we shall apply the proposition to linear differential 
games with quadratic payoffs and find the optimal pair of threat strategies in 
some special case. 
4. LINEAR-QUADRATIC GAMES 
Consider the game described by the system of linear differential equations: 
ff = Ax + Bu + Cv, x(0) = x0 (22) 
where A, B, and C are constant matrices of dimensions n x n, n x p, and 
n x q, respectively. An admissible pair (u, V) is such that 
f 
T  
II W2 dt < ~0, (23) 
0 
s 
T  
/I v(t)l12 dt < co. (24) 
0 
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The payoffs are given by the following: 
J1 = joT (~'QG + u’R,u) dt + 4V’lx(T), (25) 
Jz = joT (x'Q2x + v’R,w) dt + x’( T)Fg( T), (26) 
where Qr , Q2 , Fl , and F2 are negative semidefinite and R, and R, negative 
definite symmetric constant matrices. 
It can be easily seen that the feasible set S is a convex set in the third 
quadrant of the E2 plane. 
The Paretooptimal boundary S, of 5’ is a smooth curve given by 
So ={(rl >Y~)EE~IY~ +FY~ = yy(.L +PJ2),0 <P < 4. 
As j? --f 0, yr approaches -co, and as p + 00, y2 approaches zero. Jr = 0 
and J2 = 0 are therefore the two asymptotes of 8, . 
To apply the proposition in Section 3, we have to consider the following 
two problems: 
(i) Determine an admissible pair (u*, v*) such that 
J2 = J1 + pJ2 = joT (~'QG + U'RP + p”‘R24 dt + G'Y&), (27) 
where 0 < TV < CO, 
Qs = 81 + f~Q2, and F,=F,-l-@z 
is maximized. 
Assuming that p is a known constant, we can easily find the maximizing 
strategies: 
u* = - R;lB’p,(t) a(t), (28) 
fj* = - $ R;?p,(t) 3;‘(t), (29) 
where P2(t) satisfies the equation 
P2 = - P,A - A’P, + p, (BR;~B~ + + CR;‘C) P, - Q~ , (30) 
with P,(T) = F3 and k(t) is the solution of the equation 
2 = A - BR;lB’P, - 1 CR,%‘p, f, S(O) = xg * (31) 
P 
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(ii) Determine an admissible pair (T*, E*) such that 
J4 = J1 - pJ2 = joT(x'gZ + u'R,u - /m'R,v) dt + x'(T)F,x(T), 
where 0 < p < 00, 
Qa = 81 - PQ~ 3 and F4=Fl--Fz 
has a saddle point at (T*, f*), i.e., 
Jdrl, t-*> G Jdrl*, E*) G J&T*> 5) 
for all admissible (7, E). 
In order for (q*, [*) to exist, it is sufficient to have 
BR;lB'- +CR;'C'<O, 
Q,1 - PQ~ 2 0. 
Under these conditions, we have 
?* = - R;1B'p4(t)i(t), 
(* = - + R,1C'p4(t)x"(t), 
where P4(t) satisfies the equation 
P, = - P,A - ASP, + P~(BR;~B~- +cR;'C')P~--Q,, 
with P,(T)=F,, and i(t) is the solution of the equation 
A - BRylB'P, - -!- CR,%'P4 x", 
CL 
S(O) = x, . 
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(32) 
(33) 
(34) 
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
According to the proposition, Eqs. (36) and (37) would give the optimal 
threat strategies provided that p is known. We now determine it in the 
following. 
From Eq. (11) and also Eqs. (36)-(39), we have 
Jh*, 5*) - ~Jdrl*, 5*) = J&*> n*) - PJ&*, v*) 
(40) 
= x,'P,(O)x,. 
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But from Eqs. (28)-(31), we obtain 
Jdu*, w*) + PI&*, w*) = X”‘P3(0) x0 . 
Combining Eqs. (40) and (41) yields 
I&*, n*> = Q~o’U’d0) + f’do)) xo - 
Let us now write: 
a(t) p,(t) a(t) = l’ (alQ$ + u*‘R,u*) dt + a’(T)F,f(T). 
Then it can be easily shown that pa satisfies the equation 
h, = - & (A - BRylBrP, - + CR;‘C’P,) 
- 
( 
A - BR;lB’P, - -!- CR$Z’P, 
1 
’ P, 
P 
- P,BRylB’P, - Q1 
(41) 
(42) 
(43) 
(4) 
with ps(T) =Fr . 
Equation (42) holds not only at t = 0, but also at any instant t. Therefore 
w = W,(t) + Pdf)). (45) 
Substituting Eq. (45) into (44), we have 
p, + p4 = - (P, + Pa) (A - BR;‘B’P, - + CR;‘C’p,) 
- 
( 
A - BR;lB’P, - $ CR;‘C’p,)’ (P, + Pa) (46) 
- 2P,BR;lB’Pp, - 2Q,. 
Subtracting Eqs. (30) and (38) from Eq. (46), and after some manipulation, 
we finally obtain 
+ (P, + PJ CR,%‘(P, + P4) = (P, - Pa) BR;‘B’(P, - PJ. (47) 
Equation (47) must hold for 0 < t < T. By letting t = T, we have 
F,CR;lC’Fl = p3FzBR;%F, . (48) 
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Thus, if there exists a constant OL > 0 such that 
F CR-IC’F 1 a 1 = ciF BR-IB’F 2 1 29 (49) 
then t.~ = C$/~ provided that c2j3 satisfies Eqs. (34) and (35). 
Now assume that Fl = F, = 0 and there is a constant m > 0 such that 
and 
BRT;‘B’ = ?- CR,lC’ 
m (50) 
Q1 = mQ2. (51) 
Then Eq. (48) can no longer be used to determine CL. But an obvious choice 
for p is TV = m, for then P4 E 0 (see Eqn. (38)). Equation (47) is satisfied 
identically and so is Eqn. (11). The optimal threat strategies are now 
t77*, [*I = (0, 0). 
Finally, let us remark that in the problem of this section, bargaining on 
the basis of max-min payoffs, is not plausible since neither max, min, Jr 
nor max, min, J2 exists. 
REFERENCES 
1. P. T. LIU, Nonzero-sum Differential Games with Bargaining Solutions, J. Opti- 
mization Theory Appl. 11 No. 3 (1973). 
2. G. OWEN, “Game Theory,” W. B. Saunders Co., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 
1968. 
